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Abstract  
After a series of votes on each of the 149 articles of the constitution, the Tunisian National 
Constituent Assembly (ANC) adopted a new constitution on 26 January 2014 which was signed into 
law by President Mouncef Marzouki the following day. It marked the end of a period of political 
tension that rocked the country since the summer of 2013, when on 1 June the assembly, dominated 
by the Islamist Ennahda Movement, presented an Islamo-conservative constitution. This proposal 
was followed by the assassination of the ANC member and opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi 
on 26 July and Egypt’s military coup on 3 July 2013. 
This paper will analyse the tensions surrounding the two and a half year constitution-making 
process from the two core legal concepts of constituent power and constituted power. Drawing on 
the theoretical work of Thornhill, I will argue that key to the success of Tunisia in tempering 
tensions was the role of the judiciary in pre-revolutionary Tunisia as well as the appearance of other 
extra-judicial actors in the constitution-making process. This was complemented by significant 
references to international law and rights. During the process of drafting the constitution, the 
judiciary refrained from attempting to establish its autonomy or supremacy in deciding the correct 
application of law. Due to this, the elected assembly was charged with the unique task of 
establishing a legal-rational framework without the constraints imposed by common laws or an 
autonomous and semi-emancipated judiciary. While it is not possible to assert that this unique 
situation made the transition to institutionalised liberal-democratic rule possible, this paper will 
argue that Tunisia’s relative stability was at the very least facilitated by the fact that the judiciary 
remained in the background, denying antagonistic actors access to this institution in order to express 
their opposition to developing constitutional rule and practice.
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Introduction 
Comparative Political Scientists and North 
African specialists have faced a unique 
situation over the past four years in 
comparing both upcoming and attempted 
transitions from authoritarian rule in three 
countries and the establishment of new 
constitutions and constitutional orders in four, 
with completely different outcomes. Ann 
Lesch compared the transitions in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya from the perspective of 
inclusiveness and procedure, after the ousting 
of the former leaders, arguing that:  
Egypt’s rush to establish electoral 
democracy before creating a broadly 
legitimate constitution and fostering the 
environment for a range of political parties 
to compete boomeranged when the elected 
government monopolized power, 
marginalized other political forces and 
hastily promulgated a divisive constitution. 
The Libyan and Tunisian approach — 
writing the constitution first, under 
inclusive interim governments — has 
considerable merits. And yet, delays in 
writing their constitutions and acrimony 
among the coalition partners have caused 
stress and generated their own problems.
1
 
 
In my other work, I have compared the role of 
extra-judicial actors in political transitions 
and drafting of new constitutions in Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia. I argued that the cases 
of Morocco and Egypt show that extra-
judicial actors develop strong positions inside 
the state and are able to generate a great 
amount of trust in their respective 
constituencies. Transitions that are marked by 
extensive uncertainties and weak institutions, 
especially institutions and actors that are 
based on abstract rule of law and 
constitutionalism, are particularly vulnerable 
to political battles that are waged by extra-
judicial actors.
2
 In Morocco and Egypt,  what 
is often called the ‘deep state’ had historically 
rooted features that could easily throw into 
illegitimacy their mobilised contestants that 
attempted to establish themselves as new 
constituent power.  
 
In this paper, I seek to further analyse the 
constitutional transition process and argue 
that the relative success in Tunisia was related 
to the limited significance of its judiciary. 
This proposition may be considered 
counterintuitive with regards to what can be 
considered a mainstream hypothesis about 
transitions. After all, according to the 
standard Weberian view of law as applied to 
democratic transitions,
3
 democratising groups 
attempt to reduce the arbitrary power of 
authoritarian elites by promoting formal 
justice and equality before the law, thereby 
placing the judiciary at the heart of the 
democratising efforts. Whilst theories of 
transition have moved away from 
structuralism to more strongly focus on 
agency, epitomised by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s emphasis on ‘uncertain’ 
democracies, the judiciary together with 
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organisations of lawyers especially in areas of 
human rights, continued to be seen in the 
literature in MENA as structures in which 
agents of democratisation could emerge. As 
democratisation often emerged in the so-
called Third Wave from reforms inside the 
state, those state institutions themselves were 
legitimately considered an important subject 
for research in the emerging democratisation 
literature on the Arab world and elsewhere.
4
 
 
In focusing on the judiciary’s role in the 
transition in Tunisia, my aim is to analyse the 
tensions around Tunisia’s constitutional 
moment and identify factors that helped this 
tension to be eased. I will do so by firstly 
elaborating on a general problem in legal 
theory that I call the tension between 
constituent power and constituted power, and 
argue that this tension is the more pronounced 
the more the judiciary has a history of using 
case law, combined with attempts at 
establishing its independence vis-à-vis the 
executive powers. I will then review the 
constitution-making process in Tunisia, and 
illustrate how the absence of an involved 
judiciary gave both the secularists and  the 
Islamist Ennahda party room for 
compromises, believing that abstract 
constitutional principles could be amended by 
laws in future law making. In turn, among the 
challengers to the Ennahda-led interim 
government and constitution drafters, there 
were no members of the judiciary that would 
have posed an extra-constitutional challenge 
to the law making authority of the Constituent 
Assembly. This is emphasised in this paper as 
a similar situation in neighbouring Egypt 
resulted in the judiciary’s different position 
towards the elected constituent body. 
 
Constituent Power and 
Constituted Power in 
Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule  
 
In the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy and in the elaboration of new 
constitutions, a key question occurs with 
regards to the validity of pre-legal norms that 
ensure that the new democratic constitution 
will be adhered to and not be changed by later 
governments. Pre-legal norms are a core 
aspect that give legal systems and the political 
systems built on legal rules, legitimacy and 
ultimately stability. Pre-legal are all 
behavioural norms or legal principles that 
stabilise constitutionalism, i.e. ensure limited 
government.
5
 The most basic ones are:  
1. The laws of the constitution are 
interpreted and upheld by independent 
judges that are accountable to abstract 
judicial-legal principles and readings 
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elaborated through century old 
traditions called the rule of law.  
2. Active constitutional courts exercise 
their authority to control 
parliamentary institutions, by actively 
assessing the constitutionality of laws. 
3. Constitutional laws are superior to 
other types of laws and cannot be 
changed to serve short-term purposes. 
4. Constitutional amendments are, in and 
by themselves, subject to judicial 
scrutiny, limiting the right of people 
by once agreed on yet abstract higher 
principles. 
5. The process of judging requires pre-
legal rules and methods, such as case 
law or civil law. Judicial authority is 
informed by legal standards and not 
personal preferences.  
While liberal political thought is profoundly 
attracted to liberal norms as a method of 
legitimating both the political decision 
process and the judicial application process of 
laws, this is not always sufficient as 
authoritarian temptations in nascent as well as 
established democracies all too clearly 
illustrate. There remain fundamental flaws 
due to the judicial authorities’ constant search 
for underlying laws that lawmaker have not 
explicitly included in the law making process, 
creating tensions between democratically 
elected and accountable law makers and the 
judicial authorities. In order to ease this 
tension, searches for ‘underlying laws’ are 
generally thought to be necessarily limited by 
the rules governing judicial deliberation, in 
order to avoid undermining the 
democratically legitimated legislative 
process.
6
 In the words of Keating: ‘Courts 
exercise political power and their authority 
must be either legitimated or suspected’.7  
During transitions from authoritarian rule, the 
role of court’s legitimation is uncertain. Such 
courts will often have a history of having 
been used as an instrument of the executive to 
uphold and protect illiberal laws; the role of 
the court as a liberal, self-restraining, and 
independent judicial authority is not 
established. Its ambitions may even be subject 
to suspicion. Transitions that lead to 
constitutional moments in which the 
supremacy of one constitution is claimed by 
constituent assemblies or other representative 
bodies, produce other uncertainties about the 
pre-legal validity of the constitution that 
courts are meant to protect. The pre-legal 
validity of the constitution, resting on the 
theory of constituent power, heavily relies on 
constitutional drafters representing the nation 
as a whole and embodying its superior will 
and values. If constitution drafters are indeed 
believed to represent such constituent power, 
then the constitution’s authority and validity 
over other laws, including its own ‘eternal’ 
authority through explicit or implicit eternity 
clauses, will be much stronger and more 
readily recognised.
8
 Historically, such 
recognition has evolved in situations when 
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legal scholars could claim that constitution 
drafters included self-limitations and limited 
government in order to protect the people and 
to guarantee their rights in the long run, even 
if it limits democratic choices and majority 
rule in the short run. Furthermore, such legal 
scholars had strong advocates among judges, 
who either had a history of inherited self-rule 
and privilege in feudal Europe, or 
revolutionary ambitions as in the American 
colonies, where judges refused to apply the 
laws that were issued by Westminster.
9
 In 
turn, the probability of the constitution to 
establish constitutionalism increases, the more 
limitations on representative bodies, 
constitution drafters and the executive are 
justified with reference to the protection of 
universal rights. 
 
As an institution, therefore, the judiciary 
occupies a central yet ambivalent position in 
transitions from authoritarian rule. As it is no 
longer an instrument of an authoritarian state, 
it is capable of assuming independent legal 
reasoning and individual members may be 
inclined to assert a political role as a symbol 
of new political freedoms that the judiciary 
now enjoys. Furthermore, it may also actively 
seek to protect rights with reference to case 
law, statutory law, or other sources of law, 
and will exercise this authority as it continues 
to sit on trials as part of the state. It also 
enjoys a natural audience and publicity for 
this purpose. Yet, in constituent moments, 
some of this conflicts with the authority that 
constituent power assumes. As such, it is 
constituent power that is the origin of all 
exercise of power, including that of the 
judiciary, yet in the transitional phase, the 
organisation that lays claim to constituent 
power, the constituent assembly, also acts as 
part of the state and involves in vertical power 
relations with the subjects of the state. While 
constituted power legitimises itself as 
constituent power, this legitimation can easily 
be questioned if it does not act as constituent 
power, and if it is instead perceived to rule by 
majority over the people as whole. Still, 
referring to constituent power is very 
important in transitions as it gives the 
political order the legitimacy needed for state 
authority.  
 
An important historical difference between 
transitions and 18
th
 and 19
th
 century 
constitutional moments concerns the sources 
of rights. As Thornhill points out, in the 
history of constituent power, it has been the 
appeal to universal rights that was a core 
source of constituent power. Consequently, it 
has been the courts that have given those who 
enacted basic political order the legitimacy 
and inclusiveness that characterises the 
modern state. In contrast, in transitional 
politics, it has been the appeal of rights 
through international law has been that serves 
as a primary source of legitimacy for new 
constituent powers.
10
 As I argue in this paper, 
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this is potentially because domestic sources 
and actors remain too ambivalent and too 
closely related to constituted power to play 
this role effectively.  
 
Tunisia’s Model of 
Constitutional Review under 
Ben Ali 
 
There are two main systems of constitutional 
review and courts. On one hand, there is a 
diffuse system, and on the other hand a 
centralised system. With its common law 
system, the US has probably the best known 
of all diffuse systems, in that practically all 
courts can render judgments based on their 
reading of the US constitution. The US 
Supreme Court may review all of these 
decisions before making a binding and 
authoritative constitutional review itself. The 
continental European system, in turn, largely 
concentrates the authority to make 
constitutional reviews in the hands of a 
specialised constitutional court. The right to 
undertake such a constitutional review was 
granted to such courts restrictively, as to not 
infringe on the legislative authority of elected 
bodies. The French Conseil Constitutionel, 
for example, was explicitly conceived by 
Charles De Gaulle to prevent a government of 
judges and his perception of the US Supreme 
Court model. It could only examine new laws 
if authorised by a political authority, and only 
within limited time frames.
11
 Such 
centralisation in civil law courts has in some 
cases only recently resulted in constitutional 
courts’ assuming the authority to examine the 
constitutionality of laws, with the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in Karlsruhe 
perhaps developing a leading role. In the 
European Union, the process of increasingly 
assuming an overseeing function is regarded 
as the emancipation of courts from their 
legislative bodies. It also reflected the 
growing importance of EU law and with it, 
the internationalisation of European 
constitutional principles.  
 
In Tunisia prior to the 2011 revolution, there 
was a constitutional council, not a court, and 
only the President could refer questions to the 
council, while he also controlled the 
appointment of members of the council. The 
independence of judges and the courts was 
not institutionalised, and through 
appointments and transfers was it possible for 
the presidency to influence decisions and 
penalise too independent judges. This was 
done through the supreme council of the 
judiciary (CSM - Conseil Suprême de la 
Magistrature). Furthermore, by granting 
judges access to the lawyer’s profession after 
10 years of practice, judges could make a very 
comfortable living, gaining access to lucrative 
state-contracts.
12
 Judges in pre-revolution 
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Tunisia therefore, had much in common with 
their Moroccan counterparts, and much less in 
common with their Egyptian counterparts, the 
latter having experienced periods of 
emancipation from the executive (and the 
controlled legislative) political bodies by, for 
example, overseeing elections and granting 
political opponents access to parliamentary 
election.
13
 
 
Tunisia’s Constitutional Moment 
and the Re-emergence of 
Constituted Power 
When Tunisia’s President Zine Eddine Ben 
Ali was ousted in January 2011, the 1959 
Constitution was quickly suspended by 
executive decree and the election of a national 
constituent assembly announced to help 
stabilise the immediate post-revolutionary 
period. The interim president also dissolved 
the constitutional council by decree in March 
2011. A large number of constitutional 
lawyers did not support the idea of drafting a 
new constitution, as the 1959 text was 
considered satisfactory. The problem did not 
appear to be the legal text, but rather the 
absence of its enforcement and its violation 
by a political and judicial elite that chose to 
ignore many of its principles. After all, the 
1959 Constitution’s Chapter One enshrined 
the universality human rights in its Article 5. 
As the Constitution also enshrined the 
freedom of conscience, a right that is more 
secular than the simple freedom of religion, 
some observers believed that a new 
constitution could easily drop this clause. 
Therefore, a new constitution could 
potentially become an instrument for illiberal, 
religious principles in a period when the new 
political elite was not yet clearly defined, and 
potentially strongly influenced by Islamist 
electoral victories.  
 
In spite of these concerns, the constitutional 
process served to reinforce the constituted 
power of the state in a number of ways.  
 
First, shortly after the revolution the 
Committee for the Realization of the 
Revolution was working on a constitutional 
draft with new chapters that reinforced some 
of the revolution’s objectives, notably in areas 
of personal freedom and freedom of press. 
This was partially a response to growing 
uncertainties about the role of, and street 
protests targeting the old elite’s continuing 
hold over key institutions. A built-up of 
revolutionary pressure following January 
2011 forced the first post-revolutionary 
government of Mohamed Ghanoushi to step 
down, leaving its place to Fouad Mebazaa.
14
 
This prompted Mebazaa to call for the 
election of a National Constituent Assembly 
(ANC) and to abrogate the old constitution as 
early as in March 2011. He thereby managed 
to contain overwhelming street pressure and 
gain political control over the revolutionary 
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transition. This illustrates that the 
constitutional project served an important pre-
legal objective, namely to gain control over a 
revolutionary movement and to reconstitute 
the state as constituted power.   
 
Second, the time frame, objectives, and the 
election of the ANC were defined by 
executive decree, in order to quickly 
legitimise the new constituted powers. Once 
the ANC was elected in October 2011, the 
assembly issued a Constituent Law 
Organizing Provisional Powers that took the 
place of a mini-constitution. In 28 Articles, 
the delays for the elaboration of the 
constitution were re-defined, the formation of 
a government included, as well as the 
distribution of legislative and executive power 
determined. In the words of the constitutional 
scholar Salwa Harouni, ‘through the sheer 
fact of having been elected, the ANC believed 
that it had the divine right to alter any of the 
rules laid out before, even if the very same 
rules were constitutive for its own legitimate 
claim to rule-making’.15 While some of this 
may have been unavoidable given the need 
for effective government, from a theory of 
constituent power as outlined above, this 
process can be seen as constituted power 
emerging and engaging in a vertical power 
relations of ruling. The formation of the 
Ennahda (Islamist)-led troika government 
with its majority of almost 2/3 in the ANC 
meant that majority rule could easily 
dominate the new state. Constituent power, 
therefore, could easily give way to vertical 
rule by law, such as the law on provisional 
powers. This was all the more apparent when 
the critical and divisive character of the 
elected members of the ANC meant its claim 
to be acting on behalf of constituent power 
remained strongly questioned. Party politics 
and mass media exposure of some of ANC 
members’ ideologies, gave the council 
arguably less legitimacy and rendered the 
various rights critical for the legitimacy of the 
process. 
 
Third, the decision taken by the president of 
the ANC, Mustapha Ben Jaffar (leader of the 
Ettakatol party), to start from an “empty 
page” (feuille blanche) in the constitution’s 
drafting process compounded the autonomy 
of the constituted power in the ANC. As an 
allied party, Ettakatol belonged to the 
Ennahda-led majority in the troika 
government. In fact, there had been a number 
of constitutional projects by political parties, 
labour unions, constitutional lawyers, which 
had been publicly discussed and that were 
expected to serve as a basis for the discussion 
inside the ANC – giving the concept of 
constituent power in Tunisia a broad, 
inclusive dimension. Yet, the idea of an 
empty page turned this inclusiveness upside 
down, and resulted in shielding the ANC from 
outside influence. The ANC thereby obtained 
more authority to start a drafting process that 
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could legitimately ignore other proposals. 
Members of the ANC were also shielded from 
“expert opinions” by not institutionalising a 
committee of legal experts for the series of 
drafts that they started to produce, a process 
that was called the politics of drafts (la 
politique des brouillons). As there was only 
one constitutional lawyer elected to the 
assembly, Fadl Moussa, who was Dean of the 
Law and Political Science Department at 
Tunis University, the quality of the drafts was 
quite poor. Given the split between an 
Islamist-dominated ANC and secular forces in 
many of the organisations that had drafted 
constitutional projects prior to the election of 
the ANC, the decision of the “empty page” 
raised suspicion concerning the motivations 
of the majority in the ANC: After all, the 
practical effect was to shield the majority of 
Islamo-conservatives from secular influences. 
As will be seen, this effect was not alleviated 
by the ANC attempts at reaching out when in 
2012 it organised limited and short internal 
auditions and a series of public fora after its 
first draft was severely criticised for its lack 
of inclusiveness.
16
 
 
Rights 
These factors re-established constituted 
power, yet it triggered a high level of 
scepticism concerning the ability and 
willingness of the ANC majority to produce 
legally sound constitutional drafts, as well as 
suspicions concerning the Ennahda’s 
ambitions to transform Tunisia into a more 
religious state. Both suspicions invalidated 
the ANC’s claim to act as constituent power, 
with concomitant legitimacy questions 
resurfacing throughout the drafting process. 
The question of personal rights was a key to 
such legitimacy concerns, especially as the 
1959 constitution made extensive reference to 
the universality of rights, as well as the 
freedom of conscience. The possibility 
seemed real that both core rights could be 
critically undermined by any references to 
Islam or Islamic law. It has been through 
these suspicions and manoeuvres among the 
governmental coalition and majority in the 
ANC that the process started to suffer. 
 
In the first draft that was produced by the 
leading Ennahda party, shari’a was elevated 
to the principle source of law. The draft 
replaced equality between men and women 
with complementarity, criminalised violations 
of the “sacred.” It furthermore introduced the 
establishment of a supreme Islamic council, 
which was meant to have equal powers to the 
constitutional court. It reflected the majority 
opinion of the Troika and Ennahda, which 
controlled about two-thirds of the ANC. As 
such, the first official draft took Ennahda’s 
main concern of shari’a from Article 10 of its 
draft as a source of law. It may be noteworthy 
that in Ennahda’s own draft, articles on rights 
and liberties were included in Chapter Two 
whereas shari’a was mentioned in Chapter 
10 
 
One – indicating a certain hierarchy. 
Ennahda’s draft inlcuded impractical 
provisions. For example, it criminalised all 
forms of normalisation with sionism (Article 
2:27).  
 
Subsequent drafts gradually began to 
incorporate many of the secularists’ demands, 
even if they maintained ambiguities of 
language and wording. Predictably, the key 
rights issues related to shari’a, the protection 
of the sacred, protection through international 
law, freedom of speech and conscience, were 
those most disputed. Ennahda’s key demand, 
to form a parliamentary system and not a 
presidential one, received remarkably less 
public attention
17
 indicating the supremacy of 
rights over most other questions. On the 
question of constitutional jurisdiction, a key 
question concerned how much authority the 
constitutional court should have, and how 
judges should be controlled to actually fulfil 
the objectives of the constitution, especially 
given the personal involvement of many 
judges in the Ben Ali regime. Whilst this 
question may be considered an important long 
term technical question with important 
ramifications, in the debate it was also not 
particularly emphasised.  
 
The third draft of June 2013 illustrated the 
fact that the institutional question of the role 
of the judiciary remained uncontroversial. 
The draft included a supreme court. Its 
composition (centralised, supermajority 
model, mixed model, or model based on a 
constitutional council) was left for another 
law to be defined later on (Articles 115-121). 
Some members of the ANC tried to make it a 
non-intervening, non-activist constitutional 
court,
18
 with some of its members being 
political appointment outside of the judiciary. 
Yet, the issue on which the process threatened 
to falter was specifically related to constituted 
power, as some of the ill-defined transitional 
clauses gave the executive the authority to 
issue laws before the constitution would 
become effective. As the political threat was 
seen, this would have given the executive the 
power to abrogate or not implement any 
number of constitutional principles (Article 
146).
19
  
 
Political Gridlock and the Last 
Stage of the Transition 
 
The above section argued that Tunisia’s 
constitutional moment included a significant 
tension between the actual, newly constituted 
power and constituent power. It further 
argued that the issue of rights became pivotal, 
and that tensions over the implementation of 
many of the rights in the transitional clauses 
highlighted the tension between principles of 
majority government and constituted power 
on one hand and constituent power on the 
other.  
11 
 
After its presentation in June 2013, political 
gridlock resulted from the hostility expressed 
by a minority of members of the ANC to what 
appeared majority rule and possibly 
authoritarian temptations. These members of 
the ANC began to boycott the assembly’s 
sessions and instead protested outside of the 
assembly’s complex. They were supported by 
wide-spread protests organised by a 
significant number of civil society 
associations and tens of thousands of 
protesters. Furthermore, the July 25 
assassination of Mohamed Brahmi, a secular 
pan-Arab activist and elected member of the 
ANC, preceded by the 6 February 
assassination of Chokri Belaid, another leftist 
politician, further galvanised the opposition to 
the government and its constitutional project. 
Lax security measures and violent political 
rhetoric increasingly marked the political 
landscape, of which the attack on the US 
embassy in Tunis in September 2012 was 
emblematic. The July 2013 military coup in 
Egypt, and rumours about an impending coup 
in Tunisia, further marked political anxieties 
about a constitutional process that was 
threatening to fail and derail into violence. 
 
Under these circumstances, it is significant 
that structures outside of constituted power 
reaffirmed the importance of Tunisia’s 
constitutional moment and formed an extra-
judicial institution, the so-called Quartet, to 
oversee the problematic transitional clauses 
and allow for a new government to establish 
consensus inside the ANC (the so-called 
consensus committee). The Quartet consisted 
of the Tunisian Bar Association l’Ordre des 
Avocats, the main trade union Confédération 
Générale Des Travailleurs Tunisiens 
(CGTT), the Employer’s Federation UTICA, 
as well as Tunisia’s Human Rights League 
(LTDH).
20
 As part of the reaffirmation of the 
primacy of constituent power, majority rule 
inside the ANC was replaced with consensus 
and equal voice of the diversity of political 
currents, including many small, secular 
opposition groups. It was inside this new 
committee that the final, compromise draft 
was elaborated, yet confidence in the just 
procedural continuation included changes 
inside constituted power. Hence, the 
Ennahda-led government under Ali 
Laarayedh stepped down in November 2013 
and a caretaker government under Mehdi 
Jomaa oversaw the voting for and 
implementation of the last constitutional draft, 
as well as the election of the new parliament 
and president. 
 
The Judiciary and Tunisia’s 
Transition 
 
A new role of judiciary appeared during a 
number of controversial judgements. The 
condemnation of the Nessma TV producer 
Nabil Karoui on charges of blasphemy was 
12 
 
one of the key events in this respect. He was 
condemned for the public broadcast of the 
French-Iranian movie Persepolis and its 
dubbing in Tunisian dialect. A well-known 
Tunisian lawyer, Charfeddine Kellil, 
explained how judges lacked independence 
and neutrality in this trial in the following 
words: 
 Nabil Karoui… was sentenced on the basis 
of Articles 121 and 121bis of the Penal 
Code, for infringing on religious beliefs…. 
Yesterday’s statement shows that Nessma 
TV committed a crime that I consider a 
new crime. Before the revolution of 14 
January 2011, the Tunisian judiciary did 
not prosecute anyone for artistic and 
creative work based on these articles. 
Clearly, before the revolution the 
magistrates obeyed to state orders. Today, 
they obey to street pressure.
21
   
 
In contrast to such attempts at redefining the 
role of the judiciary, there have been little 
participation of the judiciary as specialists in 
the ANC or in public statements during much 
of the constitutional transition. The passive 
nature is related to its low profile and few, if 
any attempts to relate to constituent power. 
This has been in spite of its being part of 
constituted power and the state by sitting over 
trials and rendering public judgements such as 
that of Nessma TV producer Nabil Karoui. 
The reason for this relates to the history of 
Tunisia’s legal profession. In the past decade 
prior to the revolution, it has been lawyers 
who have frequently formed counter-
movements to the state. The Tunisian Bar 
Association and its presidents have frequently 
contested the state’s authority. The Bar 
Association was also instrumental in the 
January 2011 revolution, when they 
demonstrated prior, during and after the main 
events and participated, together with 
Tunisia’s main labour union UGTT in 
transition organisations such as the Quartet.
22
 
The historical compromise that they oversaw 
included amongst others a constitutional 
consensus committee in which all parties, 
regardless of their relative weight inside the 
constituent assembly, where represented and 
had voting rights. In contrast, the Association 
of Tunisian Judges (Association des 
Magistrats Tunisiens, AMT) has been a fringe 
association and lacked public credibility. 
When the constitutional council was 
dissolved by presidential order, nobody 
protested. In fact, the AMT had since 2005 
become ineffective: Its president was barred 
at the time, and judges were subjected to 
intense controls to ensure that they remain 
instruments of the executive.
23
 Judges lacked 
so much credibility and authority to act as a 
single body that upon the revolution, a second 
association/union of judges was formed, the 
Syndicat des Juges, partially in response to 
threats of purges against sitting judges. The 
AMT, in an attempt to gain independence 
after the revolution, appeared to be pursuing a 
course against its old controlling members.
24
 
Thus, as a political force, judges had little 
power and credibility yet they also did not 
attempt to take part in public discussions 
about the constitution and the make-up of the 
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constituent assembly. Whilst a number of 
politicians were reluctant to give the 
constitutional court authority to review the 
constitutionality of laws, this remained a 
technical, not a political topic. In this respect, 
it is noteworthy that when a number of 
politicians challenged the electoral law before 
the provisional constitutional court, alleging 
that the new law did not respect the principle 
of parity, the provisional constitutional court 
heard the case yet refrained from interfering 
in a disappointing judgement that simply 
repeated the electoral law.
25
 In other words, it 
was acutely aware of its lack of authority as 
the protector of rights and therefore 
constituent power, and therefore remained on 
the side. The history of Tunisia’s judiciary of 
non-interference in the civil law tradition, and 
of not emancipating itself from the state by 
relying, for example, on case law, arguably 
stabilised the fragile constitutional moment.  
The fact that the role of the judiciary was 
uncontroversial is reflected in general 
attitudes that the Arab Barometer revealed in 
September 2012. Whilst the high level of 
corruption and it having been an instrument of 
the regime is reflected in a high level of no 
trust (39), as an institution of the state it was 
still considered as acting with a fairly high 
level of professionalism, potentially reflecting 
their apolitical stance before and during the 
revolution. The relevant counter example are 
political parties, that garnered a high level of 
distrust (56% distrust and only 23% trust) and 
that could arguably be mobilised in the high 
level of protests against the constitutional 
drafts.
26
 (See Table 1, p. 16) 
 
International Law and Tunisia’s 
Transition 
As mentioned in the first part of this paper, a 
core aspect of Thornhill’s work on constituent 
power is that as in the past, it is strongly 
linked to rights which give judges the 
authority to overcome suspicions that may 
otherwise be justified for democratic 
majorities (the tension between constituted 
and constituent power).
27
 In contemporary 
legal systems, he further notes that there is a 
process of the internationalisation of such 
rights, such as in the European Union, but 
also that international law provides a crucial 
source of rights in situation of transitions.  
 
In at least two respects, references to 
international law and rights have been 
significant in Tunisia’s constitution writing 
process. First, from its first draft to its last, the 
chapter on rights included references to the 
universality of human rights as enshrined in 
international law. In fact, this clause even 
became subjected to debates due to shari’a: 
After all, Islamic law similarly prescribes an 
externality of rights that has given many 
constitutions an important source of extra-
judicial legitimacy and trust. In the case of 
Tunisia, this posed a conflict as many 
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politicians not only wanted to include shari’a 
as a source of legislation, but also to adapt the 
international human rights regime to local 
specificities. In the end, though, as Marks 
reports, external advisors mainly from the 
European Union convinced a large number of 
constitution drafters that a constitution was 
not the place to include limitations, an 
important point that became particularly 
relevant when some drafters believed in the 
importance to limit the freedom of speech 
with regards to Islam and sacred values.
28
 
Second, in the more recent process of drafting 
specific laws for the constitutional court as 
well as the supreme judicial council, the 
Tunisian parliament asked the European 
Union for an independent opinion on its draft 
law on the constitutional court.
29
 Key 
controversies included the election of 
members, their authority, legal or scientific 
qualifications and reserve lists for civil 
society activists. It thereby appeared to be 
responding to a long list of criticism from 
Human Rights Watch but also from the 
international commission of jurists, which in 
November 2015 issued a report on the 
effectiveness and independence of the 
Constitutional Court and the High Judicial 
Council.
30
 Prior to that, the Tunisian 
permanent mission to the United Nations had 
already consulted with the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
about the independence of the judiciary, 
resulting in an OSCE advisory report.
31
 The 
role of international rights and discourses is 
particularly striking in the constitution itself – 
as a European Commission policy paper 
observes: 
The language used in these parts of the 
new constitutional settlement is strikingly 
succinct and akin to the approach found in 
international human rights conventions or 
Western constitutions like those of the 
United States and Germany.
32
 
 
Conclusion 
The legal discussion on constituent power 
illustrates that as an actual concept it 
emanates from constituted powers claims to 
act on behalf of the people. Yet, they also 
emanate from legal professions’ and here in 
particular judges as members of the 
constituted power, pre-legal functions and 
behaviours and claims to authority based on 
rights. The latter had, historically, evolved 
against the constituted power of the state. 
Whilst courts remained an instrument of the 
state, tensions between the rights of people 
and majorities to rule through people’s 
sovereignty and the rule of judges emerged.  
The case of Tunisia’s constitution making 
process illustrates that the constituent 
assembly attempted primarily through its 
majority to issue different drafts with its 
vision of individual rights and freedoms, as 
well as the organisation of constituted power. 
As constituted power, it did not face abstract 
legal hurdles that rule of law and an 
independent judiciary may represent. In fact, 
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it primarily faced the hurdles by continuing 
protests, lack of expertise and credibility, as 
well as an accelerated use of violence across 
the country. Altogether, these represented a 
rival, strongly legitimate, and highly 
resonating reference to alternative constituent 
power. Therefore, constituent power did not 
emerge from abstract legal concepts based on 
the rule of law, nor from trust in the legal 
professions per se. Rather, the involvement of 
a large, mobilised society and the absence of 
emancipated courts allowed for a political 
compromise to emerge with successful 
references to the people and active 
involvement of the people. This means on the 
other hand that the constituent assembly did 
not feel intimidated by an assumed authority 
of judges. 
This, however, does not mean that the 
combination of international rights and 
constituent power was not relevant. To the 
contrary, the frequent references and 
continued use of international institutions and 
laws as higher level law has constrained 
members of the constituted power (i.e. in the 
constituent assembly) and made it align with 
the expression of a wide, and inclusive 
section of mobilised society. 
A last point to make is that the drafting 
process described in this paper is by no means 
a guarantee of any particular long-term 
political path for Tunisia. A Tunisian 
constitutional lawyer expressed the following 
view, which illustrates that the Tunisian 
constitution is not yet the result of legal 
certainty or trust expressed through 
constituent power, but rather of a collective 
effort of creating a constitutional frame that 
judges and electoral majorities together will 
require to give more meaning in the future.  
The seeds of social and ideological 
conflicts are still represented in the 
constitution. The reason why everybody 
was in agreement was not because there 
was consensus, but rather because they left 
enough open space for everybody to read 
into the constitution whatever they wanted. 
For example: What does “Etat Civil” really 
mean, when the state’s obligation is to 
“protect religion”? There is a fundamental 
contradiction between Article 1 and Article 
6, and it will depend on the political and 
judicial authorities to clarify. All of this 
will further the ideological conflicts that 
are expressed in the constitution. In a 
word, the constitution is filled (bourrée) 
with apparent consensus that only hides 
ideological contradictions.
33
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Tables  
Table 1: “I will name a group of institutions and I would like you to tell me to what extent you trust 
each of these institutions” (Question 201) 
 I trust it 
to a large 
extent 
I trust it to 
a moderate 
extent 
Total 
Trust 
I trust it to 
a little 
extent 
I don’t 
trust it at 
all 
Total No 
Trust  
I don’t 
know 
The 
judiciary 
16% 35% 51% 16% 23% 39% 10% 
General 
Security 
“Police” 
19% 39% 55% 15% 22% 37% 5% 
Political 
Parties 
6% 17% 23% 18% 38% 56% 21% 
Armed 
Forces 
73% 16% 89% 3% 4% 7% 4% 
Civil 
Society 
Institution
s 
7% 24% 31% 14% 26% 40% 29% 
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